There are both statistically valid and invalid reasons why scientists with differing default hypotheses can disagree in high-profile situations. Examples can be found in recent correspondence in this journal, which may offer lessons for resolving challenges to mainstream science, particularly when adherents of a minority view attempt to elevate the status of outlier studies and/or claim that self-interest explains the acceptance of the dominant theory. Edward J. Calabrese and I have been debating the historical origins of the linear no-threshold theory (LNT) of carcinogenesis and its use in the regulation of ionizing radiation. Professor Calabrese, a supporter of hormesis, has charged a committee of scientists with misconduct in their preparation of a 1956 report on the genetic effects of atomic radiation. Specifically he argues that the report mischaracterized the LNT research record and suppressed calculations of some committee members. After reviewing the available scientific literature, I found that the contemporaneous evidence overwhelmingly favored a (genetics) LNT and that no calculations were suppressed. Calabrese's claims about the scientific record do not hold up primarily because of lack of attention to statistical analysis. Ironically, outlier studies were more likely to favor supralinearity, not sub-linearity. Finally, the claim of investigator bias, which underlies Calabrese's accusations about key studies, is based on misreading of text. Attention to ethics charges, early on, may help seed a counter narrative explaining the community's adoption of a default hypothesis and may help focus attention on valid evidence and any real weaknesses in the dominant paradigm.
Introduction
We have seen in the climate change debate how scientific disputes about issues of social interest, and claims of fraud, can spread into contentious policy arenas, ending the chance for resolution by scientists (Dunlap, 2013; Lindzen, 2006) . It behooves the scientific community in such situations to focus attention on minority views early, to see how much the arm of inference is being stretched, if at all, and the extent to which narrow focus, repetition and/or startling character attacks might be covering over weaknesses in analysis. It also behooves the scientific community to double check for any holes and circular reasoning in the dominant paradigm.
In the case of risks from low levels of ionizing radiation, the time is now for the scientific community to examine the basis for claims that financial self-interest, bias, fraud, and collusion underlie the default hypothesis of a linear, no-threshold dose response (LNT). The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has recently been petitioned to adopt for regulatory purposes the hormesis theory, which hypothesizes that ionizing radiation is beneficial to health below some dose. This hypothesis is championed by Edward J. Calabrese , who I have been debating in the pages of this journal (Beyea, 2016d; Calabrese, 2015 , particularly about his historical theories of scientific misconduct and financial self-interest, which have been offered as part of the justification for the hormesis petition (Marcus, 2015) . In general, Calabrese's theories continue to be cited by other proponents of the hormesis alternative to the default LNT theory (Cuttler, 2016) . And, he has requested Science magazine to investigate and retract its reprinting of the major portions of a 1956 genetics report from a committee of the US National Academy of Sciences, which he believes was ultimately responsible for regulatory agencies adopting and continuing to support a linear, no-threshold model in the regulation of carcinogenic substances, both radioactive and chemical (Calabrese, 2015 at 440) . (The genetics committee will hereafter be referred to as the 1956 NAS committee.).
The report in question was titled, "Report of the Committee on Genetic Effects." It was one of six reports that made up the publication, Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (NAS, 1956 ). The reports summarized, "the first technical findings and recommendations of six committees established to carry on a continuing study of the biological effects of atomic radiations from the points of view of genetics, pathology, meteorology, oceanography and fisheries, agriculture and food supplies, and the disposal and dispersal of radioactive wastes." Financial support was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation.
Some of the reports, including the genetics report, were reprinted in Science in full or in part. In his request to Science for an investigation of the 1956 NAS genetics committee, Calabrese charges scientific misconduct on the part of the committee's members (Adams, 2015) , using as an authority his publication (Calabrese, 2015) in this journal, Environmental Research. Even though Science declined to proceed with his request, the fact that they did not investigate may itself provide fodder for the political arena.
As a result of these developments, I have been analyzing Calabrese's charges in detail. The larger issue in dispute is the historical origin of the linear no-threshold theory of carcinogenesis (cancer LNT) and its use in the regulation of ionizing radiation and chemical exposures. Note that there are two LNT's up for debate, one for genetic damage and one for carcinogenesis.
As I have written earlier in this series, I do not accept the idea, as Calabrese argues in his papers, that the 1956 genetics committee was responsible for adoption of the LNT for cancer by government agencies in the years ahead (Calabrese, 2015 at 440) . And, if the Committee had been influential in this regulatory way, their advice would have been consistent with modern views expressed in reports of the US National Academy of Science on ionizing radiation. Nevertheless, because of the policy discussion, I find it important to check the validity of the accusations made in Calabrese's papers about the committee and those people and institutions that supported it. He is not shy as to how wide he casts his net; it lands over the entire 1956 NAS committee, which included one member already with a Nobel Prize and one member soon to receive one. A third member of the committee had done research that would soon gain him a Lasker award. Three members would one day gain a National Medal of Science. There were a great many on the committee who had served, or would serve, as presidents of the American Association for Science, presidents of scientific societies and/or presidents of universities (See Supplementry material, Section S-8.1.2).
In addition to the 1956 NAS committee, Calabrese's net of accusations covers pretty much geneticists around the world, the leadership of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, as well as the Rockefeller Foundation. Furthermore, he casts the narrative in political terms, concluding that a conspiracy, beginning in the late 1940s and lasting 30 years or longer (Calabrese, 2015) , existed among geneticists to promote false views, to mislead the community with fraudulent data, and to ensure the continuation of the wrong default hypothesis. ("The explicit deceptions of some Panel members continued even some 35 years after the fact"). (Calabrese, 2014 (Calabrese, , 2015 . Rebuttals of many of these views by several scientists, including me, have been published (Beyea, 2016d; Cicerone and Crowley, 2014) . Calabrese has responded (Calabrese, 2014 .
The main theme that I address in this paper is the validity of the science underlying the 1956 report that Calabrese has challenged in his papers, along with the faithfulness of the 1956 report's description of that science and the faithfulness of its reporting of quantitative calculations made by committee members. In the process I compare the language in the committee's report to Calabrese's characterization of it. I also explore the validity of Calabrese's charge that the 1956 NAS committee members adjusted their LNT finding (or, for that matter, their recommendation of a dose standard) out of financial self-interest.
The five key claims by Calabrese that I address in this paper are:
1) The underlying science was not in full support of a linear nothreshold response for genetic damage at low doses and the committee knew, or should have known, that this was the case at 543). Thus, in Calabrese's view, to have accepted and promoted the LNT anyway, the committee must have been engaged in scientific misconduct and/or corrupt behavior. 2) The 1956 genetics committee, according to Calabrese, was guilty of "falsifying and fabricating the research record." (Calabrese, 2015 at 433) . And, they supposedly recommended a "switch" from a threshold model for genetic damage to a linear no-threshold model. (Calabrese, 2016 at 535, 536, 542) . 3) Key low dose studies of the 1940s were biased and fraudulent, according to Calabrese's writings, and one committee member knew this and was therefore complicit (Calabrese, 2015 at 433, 439-440; Calabrese, 2016 at 537-539) . 4) The committee, according to Calabrese, "deliberately misrepresented the scientific record" and "mislead the scientific community and the public" by suppressing calculations and by understating by a large factor the uncertainty in a genetic damage calculation made by a subset of the committee (Calabrese, 2016 at 540-541) . (Note that no recommendation was based on genetic damage calculations.) 5) The committee altered its views and did so because of financial inducements.
I address, and I hope refute, each of these five claims in the sections that follow, which are arranged in a historical timeline. I argue, for instance, that Calabrese has not properly characterized either the historical scientific evidence in favor of a linear, no-threshold model for genetic damage, nor has he properly characterized the 1956 committee report's content.
If I am successful, Calabrese's prosecutorial case collapses in its entirety. In any case, I do not expect Professor Calabrese to agree. I write this article for those interested in dose response and for those who simply like a good debate. Another reason I have undertaken this analysis is to make the path easier for any future investigations of Calabrese's charges, such as might be carried out by scientific reviewers and review bodies like the US NAS. (It is also a fascinating period in the history of science).
For those who strongly hold default hypotheses that differ from the LNT, the evidence for the LNT may not be so persuasive. There is always uncertainty in data and theory. Perhaps Calabrese's negative conclusions about the genetics LNT in the 1950s could simply be understood in a Bayesian context involving different weights assigned to studies and various prior hypotheses. Alternatively, it is also conceivable that he may have passed too quickly over the content of scientific papers, including their statistical analyses. To get some idea of the balance in this case, I reviewed in detail Calabrese's scientific citations and other relevant scientific papers from the period. I will argue in what follows that selective citations from the literature and misreading of text formed the basis for Calabrese's accusations of misconduct. He is not a historian, nor does he publish in historical journals, so some humility would have been expected when tarnishing the ethical record of others.
I am not a historian, either. When I go outside the scientific record to rebut trans-science charges like fraud, misconduct and financial self interest, I try to rely on secondary materials prepared by historians, which often include quotations from, and analysis of, private correspondence and/or meeting transcripts. Only when the scientific and historical literature are insufficient to reply to an accusation -only then will I discuss or cite to my own readings of the transcripts of the two 1956 NAS committee meetings or to quotations from selected private correspondence that have appeared in earlier Calabrese publications. I particularly want to avoid the approach of postulating the thought processes of historical figures, which can look like an attempt to pressure the reader into a favorable frame of mind. I also want to avoid the risk of missing cultural and historical context. (See Supplementary material, S-8.3).
The approach of maximizing use of the public literature has been sufficient to rebut the five charges listed above that Professor Calabree has made. (I do not address in this paper accusations directed to one committee member, Nobel Prize winner, Hermann J. Muller, unless they are relevant to the 1956 NAS committee. To go further would require a separate article to supplement the rebuttals I made in my first comment on Calabrese's assertions (Beyea, 2016d) ).
Relying primarily on public literature, most importantly the 1956 genetics report, itself, means that other analysts can easily check most of what I have concluded. This approach should minimize the chances of making amateurish mistakes in the history of science. In the online Supplementary material in section S-8.3, I describe the primary and secondary sources on which I have relied, and how they relate to my key arguments. My prior beliefs about the LNT can be found in a 2012 paper (Beyea, 2012) , in which I argue that all views can be incorporated into risk assessment by accounting for uncertainty above and below the LNT. Whereas Professor Calabrese is a critic of the NAS, in past and modern times , I have found that the NAS committee approach is a good method, albeit imperfect, for developing consensus scientific findings and recommendations for delivery to government decision makers.
When reviewing Calabrese's arguments, in addition to finding incomplete citation lists and misreading of text, I also found statistical and other gaps, in almost all of his anti-LNT interpretation of historical articles and reports, as discussed in what follows, thereby whittling his credible evidence down to a few studies. Even those few studies have alternate interpretations that are consistent with a genetic LNT, which is an indication of how easy it can be for intelligent scientists to come to very different conclusions. Professor Calabrese has an important role to play in the broader context of testing the arguments for linearity, but not by demeaning the ethical reputations of dead scientists through what I argue below is innuendo, incomplete analysis, and incorrect scholarship.
To assess the reasonableness of the NAS committee's view of radiation genetics, I begin with a discussion of the genetic consensus developed by 1948-a consensus that I find was based on a large number of scientific papers and reports, and thoroughly reviewed at the time in books and articles by many different researchers in the US, the UK and Germany (Catcheside, 1948; Lea, 1946; Oliver, 1934; Schultz, 1936; Timofeeff-Ressovsky, 1934) . I then move on to discuss the successful resolution of a 1948 challenge to the genetic LNT that came from a fruit fly study by Caspari and Stern, which was quickly replicated. In the process, I critique Calabrese's assessment of this work. I argue that he was mistaken in his claim that investigator bias had been acknowledged in a 1947 report. I argue also that he was mistaken to claim that geneticists did not consider dose responses other than linear ones.
Next, I cover evidence in plants and mice that would have been known to the 1956 NAS committee. Having gone through the historical science record in detail and having served on many committees of the NAS myself, I cannot imagine any NAS committee at the time not accepting a genetic LNT, but the judgment must be made by each reader. In addition to my review of the solidness of the scientific record, I compare Calabrese's characterization of the report with its actual language. I rebut the idea that the committee switched its views at all on LNT (Calabrese, 2016 at 535, 536, 542) , which means that there could not have been switching of views on the LNT to reap financial inducements from the Rockefeller Foundation, as implied by Calabrese (2016 at 536) . In the discussion section, I discuss lessons learned from this controversy that may be applicable in similar situations.
In the online Supplementary material and in an unpublished project report, available on the web (Beyea, 2016a) , I respond to defenses not covered here that Calabrese has put forth to my earlier critique, which focused on the 1956 committee itself, without going into detail about the underlying scientific basis for its conclusion, I also include in the Supplementary material a section responding to Calabrese's claims that I made errors in my critique. Although I found no errors on my part with respect to his charges, most of which dealt with minor issues, I did find an indirect error that I made. I mistakenly implied that a group of other researchers critical of the LNT had adopted the personal-attack approach put forth by Calabrese and were somehow derivative of him. Siegel and Sacks have naturally taken great exception to this mistake (Sacks and Siegel, 2016) , saying their approach to criticizing the LNT "was the opposite of Calabrese's" and that they did not charge "dishonesty and deception." For this mischaracterization, I apologize. Although I disagree with Siegel and colleagues as to their reasoning and conclusions about the LNT (see (Beyea, 2016b (Beyea, , 2016c ), they fall within a long tradition in science of contesting conventional wisdom based on data interpretation, not the kind of ad hominem attacks about ethics that I have challenged in my responses in this journal to the Calabrese papers. For a list of examples of his language to which I objected in my first critique, see my 2016, Table 1 (Beyea, 2016d) . I am not objecting to accusations about bad science, only accusations of moral frailty, which, if they belong anywhere, belong in a journal of the history of science or other social-science venue.
Consensus on the LNT before 1948
Professor Calabrese claims that the "…Genetics Panel should be evaluated for scientific misconduct for deliberate misrepresentation of the research record in order to enhance an ideological agenda." . He does not describe this ideological agenda, so I cannot respond to his categorization of supposed motives, but I can look at the research record, which I now do.
The committee's report concluded that, "to the best of current knowledge," genetic mutations occur roughly in proportion to the dose of received radiation with no threshold-what we refer to today under a variety of names, namely "LNT," "LNT hypothesis," "LNT theory," or "LNT dose-response model." The committee's report did not pretend that everything was known, saying, "…we should vigorously pursue the researches which will in time give us a more precise way of judging all aspects of the risk." On the face of it, this sounds like a responsible discussion of the genetic LNT, written, as it was, by prominent members of the scientific establishment in the field of genetics; the idea is to base understanding of genetic risk on the best current model until newer information is available.
Is this a misrepresentation of the research record? Let us examine the basis for the report's conclusion about genetic dose response. By 1948, the consensus among geneticists was overwhelmingly in favor of a genetic LNT for (single-hit) mutations, as can be seen in the comprehensive, 1948 review article by D. G. Catcheside of Cambridge University (Catcheside, 1948) , as well as earlier reviews (Demerec, 1938; Lea, 1946; Oliver, 1934; Schultz, 1936; Timofeeff-Ressovsky, 1934) . In contrast to Calabrese's claim (Calabrese, 2016 at 546) , doseresponse functions other than linear were considered, studied in detail when they occurred (primarily in chromosome or chromatid aberrations), and interpreted theoretically in terms of multiple hits. Examples in plants are: (Conger and Giles, 1950; Lea and Catcheside, 1942; Rick, 1940; Sax, 1938 Sax, , 1939 Sax, , 1940 . Chromosome and chromatid aberrations were considered to be one pathway to actual mutations, distinct from possible point mutations.
The 1936 review by Schultz noted that the intersection with the zero-dose axis of a linear fit (with floating intercept) fell above the control group average when all of the available genetic fruit fly data was fitted on the same graph (Schultz et al., 1936) . No statistical assessment was made, yet such a result is not supportive of Calabrese's view of a threshold or hormesis; it is more consistent with a response greater than the LNT (supra-linearity), suggesting that the LNT, which is forced to go through the origin, would be non-conservative at low doses. Schultz called for more data at the very low end of the curve, a region which was finally studied in drosophila during WWII, with results published in 1948 by Spencer and Stern supportive of linearity down to 25 r (Spencer and Stern, 1948) . By coincidence 25-r turned out to be close to the average instantaneous dose received by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki populations. It was also the cumulative dose over reproductive life that was being discussed in the 1950s before the atmospheric test ban treaty as to what future populations might expect hypothetically over and above natural background radiation (Muller, 1952 at 331) . I note that members of the 1956 NAS committee expressed concerns in their meetings about potential increases in population exposure from bomb tests, the commercialization of atomic power, and medical irradiation (NAS, 1956b at 16, 22, 46, 59, 88-89, 97, 123-124, 129-130) .
Calabrese, in contrast to reviewers of the day, has shown no hesitation in asserting that the evidence at the time was insufficient for geneticists to adopt an LNT as the default hypothesis at low doses (Calabrese, 2015 at 434-436; Calabrese, 2016 at 536-538, 543) (where single hit response would dominate). Not because future research proved them wrong, which it did not (Vogel and Motulsky, 1997) , but because Calabrese's readings of some of that literature convinced him otherwise. Yet geneticists had a lot of quantitative studies on which to base their views.
By 1948, there were at least 11 papers showing linearity of mutations in fruit flies (Catcheside, 1938; Demerec, 1933; Hanson et al., 1931; Oliver, 1930; Ray-Chaudhuri, 1944; Spencer and Stern, 1948; Timofeeff-Ressovsky, 1939; Timofeeff-Ressovsky and Delbruck, 1936; Timofeeff-Ressovsky and Zimmer, 1938; TimofeeV-Ressovsky et al., 1935; Zimmer and Timoféeff-Ressovsky, 1939) . Calabrese cites only some of them. All but one had more than 3 dose points to assess.
There were three additional early experiments on fruit flies, carried out in the immediate years after proof of x-ray induced mutations had been found by Muller. These experiments had but 2 dose points to analyze (Muller, 1927 (Muller, , 1928 Weinstein, 1928) , often with extremely small counts of mutation indicators and thus underpowered. These 2-data-point studies were discounted for dose-response at the time by their authors and by reviewers (Oliver, 1934) , but not by Calabrese. Were they to be taken seriously they would only provide support for supralinear response (e.g., square root of dose), not the sublinear response favored by Calabrese. Studies showing an apparent supralinear response were not identified as such by Calabrese; he took them as evidence against the LNT, without recognizing the direction of the supposed discrepancy (and without considering the statistical uncertainties). I have found no mention in any of Calabrese's writings of supra-linearity. In his critiques of the 1956 NAS committee, Professor Calabrese speaks of the LNT as being an overestimate at 537) and precautionary (Calabrese, 2016 at 537-8) , only mentioning possible threshold evidence (Calabrese, 2016, 535-538,543, 544) . His focus was made clear when he stated that he "had extensively researched the history of the non-linear (hormetic) dose-response model, its scientific foundations and its failure to thrive and outcompete the linear no-threshold (LNT) dose-response model during the first half of the 20th century" (Calabrese, 2015) .
To ignore supra-linearity is equivalent to looking only at points below the average and claiming that the average is too high. To be clear, Calabrese does not claim that hormesis responses exist in genetic doses below the supposed threshold dose, but he does claim that the adoption of the genetic LNT model for somatic risks by regulators cut off the possibility of incorporating other theories, such as hormesis, into cancer dose response models (Calabrese, 2016 at 538) .
In any case, there were not enough counts of mutation indicators and dosage points in most of these very early studies of interest to Calabrese to make them of much use for determining the genetic doseresponse curve. For example, one of the "contrary" studies on which Calabrese relies had only two counts at one dosage level and only two at the second (Hanson, 1928) , so its apparent supralinear response is statistically uninformative. Limited statistics also makes uninformative the supralinear response found in other two dose point studies cited by Calabrese, according to the authors (Muller, 1927 (Muller, , 1928 Weinstein, 1928) . Nevertheless, I find it ironic that Calabrese's early citations of a non-linear response were actually of the form that would underestimate risk, if LNT extrapolations were carried out, and if one ignored the poor statistics and the fact that the results did not hold up when multiple dose points were assessed.
I note that Calabrese refers to many of these studies discussed above indirectly by reference to an earlier paper (Calabrese, 2009) . Also, there are two studies favorable to an LNT interpretation that I have not listed Heys, 1929, 1932) , because Lea in his 1946 book found "unreasonably little statistical variation" in the data and some inconsistencies in description of experimental arrangements, leading Lea to exclude the studies from consideration (Lea, 1946 at 146) .
Geneticists had data available on both visible and lethal mutations, as discussed in Catcheside's review:
"Within the error of the experiments the proportion of visible mutations, induced by X-rays in a given organism, is linearly proportional to the dose." (Catcheside, 1948) There were much more data on recessive lethal mutations in fruit flies, so Catcheside was able to reach an even stronger conclusion for them:
"……The significant points are that the yield of mutations is strictly proportional to the dose, that for a given dose the yield is independent of the time over which the irradiation is extended and that the yield for a given ionization in the tissue diminishes with increase of ion density of the radiation."
Calabrese cites but a single fruit fly study that is consistent with a possible sublinear response, namely the 1948 Caspari and Stern study, which will be discussed later. A second high-dose study in fruit flies (Serebrovsky and Dubinin, 1930 ) that Calabrese believes "did not support a linear dose-response" (Calabrese, 2011b) turned out to support a perfectly linear response when I fitted the 3 exposureduration data points to a straight line; it passed directly through the origin (Fig. S-1a) , whereas a quadratic fit intersected the axis high above zero mutation frequency. In similar studies, Muller had found control mutation rates some 100 times less than the 10% predicted by the quadratic fit (Muller, 1928) , making such a fit implausible. Thus, there would have been no refutation of the LNT. Nevertheless, no actual control rate data were given in the paper by Serebrovsky and Dubinin, so analysts with different default hypotheses could conceivably take comfort from the same data. The same would be true had anyone fit the 3-points to a Poisson regression, although a quadratic fit did give a slightly better fit than a linear fit, but once again the high mutation rate predicted by a quadratic Poisson regression for zero exposure would likely contradict control measurements, had they been available. (See Fig. S-1b) .
The genetic LNT was supported theoretically by the "hit theory" (more formally called target theory) (Lea, 1940) , which was based on the physics of interactions of matter with particles and photons. It provided a conceptual framework for thinking about genetic impacts, and "successfully account(ed) for several important experimental facts." (Fano, 1942) . Nevertheless, the theory could be criticized (e.g., as to the idea that there was a precise target (Fano, 1942) ) and efforts were made continually to improve the theory (Fano, 1942; Herskowitz, 1951; Thoday, 1953) . Under the theory, single hits have a linear doseresponse independent of dose rate, the double hit response is quadratic, etc. The mutation rate depends on dose rate for double and higher hit mutations. Calabrese, himself, has recognized in earlier papers the importance of target theory for the foundation of the LNT, particularly the single-hit component (Calabrese, 2013b) .
When it came to chromosome aberrations, single, double, and multiple breaks could actually be seen and counted under the microscope. Experiment after experiment confirmed linearity for fruit fly mutations and for single break chromosome and chromatid aberrations in plants (Catcheside, 1948 ).
There were also data on chromosomal and chromatid aberrations in fruit flies (Bauer et al., 1938; Kaufmann, 1941; Muller, 1940) . Single breaks were found to be linear in dose response, but total aberrations often followed a more complex curve when initiated by x-or gammarays. 3/2 power laws were common (Muller, 1940) . The 3/2 effect was found to be quadratic in the lowest dose ranges (Muller, 1940) or found to be quadratic after greater data collected (Kaufmann, 1941) , providing the signal of two-hit phenomena (Giles, 1943 citing Bauer, 1939 Muller, 1940) . Why the fruit fly mutation rates remained linear at high doses, when the aberrations as a group did not, was a bit of a puzzle, and attributed to biological removal before reproduction of the multiply damaged elements. It was also possible that double breaks in aberrations led to different mutation end points, or that multiple compensating factors were operating, two according to Muller (Muller, 1954a) , or three according to Herskowitz (Herskowitz, 1951) . It is worth noting at this point that even with quadratic or higher dose terms involved in aberration frequency, linearity would hold as dose was decreased and the multiple hit terms with their higher powers of dose became irrelevant. Thus, once a dose was low enough to reveal a linear region, as was the case with experiments in fruit flies, linearity would persist under the target theory at all lower doses. See the online supplement for the 1956 NAS committee's discussion of target theory vs. thresholds, as recorded in the transcript for February of 1956.
The lowest dose prior to 1956 at which linearity was checked for single chromosome breaks (down to 8R) was not in fruit flies, but in a grasshopper species (Carlson, 1941) . Not only did experiments confirm a linear dose response, when expected, they also confirmed that single hit effects in fruit fly experiments were independent of the rate at which the dose was delivered, as predicted by hit theory, at least down to 400 r delivered over 30 days (Ray-Chaudhuri, 1944) . No wonder there was such a strong consensus among geneticists by 1948 for the LNT. It had become the default hypothesis-the base against which every study of dose or dose rate dependence would be judged. It was confidence in hit theory and its experimental support that led geneticists to think that linearity for single hit events would continue down to zero dose. Thus, when the 1956 genetics committee described the state of knowledge about the genetic effects of atomic radiation, they were accurately reflecting the science of this early period.
For geneticists of the 1940s, it would have taken an earthquake to shake the consensus on the LNT for both mutations and single breaks of chromosomes and chromatids. Actually, tremors of such an earthquake arrived in the form of a 1948 paper by Caspari and Stern. 3. 1948-1949: 
tremors under the (LNT) ground
Given the consensus for a genetic LNT, it was startling to learn of the 1948 paper of Caspari and Stern in fruit flies, which seemed to offer a challenge to the dose-rate independence of the hit theory at one of the lowest doses studied at the time, 50-r. The story begins during World War II, when, after 3-person years of effort, Spencer and Stern had found general agreement with the genetic LNT down to 25 r in studying recessive fruit fly lethal mutations, when doses were delivered in 5 min or less (Spencer and Stern, 1948) . Linearity for these doses implied that these mutations were caused by single hit mechanisms according to the hit theory. Thus, changing the dose rate at which a dose was delivered should make no difference in mutation rates, at least within the limits of experimental error. (In contrast, rates of aberrations caused by double hits were expected to drop with protracted exposure, as one of the breaks was rejoined over time, a kind of repair mechanism.) As previously stated, the prediction of dose-rate independence in fruit flies had been verified down to 400 r total dose (Dempster, 1941; Muller, 1940; Ray-Chaudhuri, 1944) .
Still, the Stern group, with its ability to measure mutation rates down to 50-r, decided to see if dose-rate independence held at these lower doses. In the first protracted experiment, the 50-r dose was spread over 21 days, a duration slightly less than the average lifetime of a fruit fly (Hollingsworth et al., 1978) . Surprisingly, this first test produced a mutation rate 4-fold lower than expected (0.036% instead of 0.147%), with a high p-value of 0.3 (Caspari and Stern, 1948) . The high p-value raised the possibility that the true value for mutations after a 50-r protracted exposure could possibly be zero, indicating a dose-rate threshold, contradicting the pure, one-hit model. How could a dose-rate threshold show up? One way would be if there were a dose threshold below 25-r. Protracted exposure might be thought of as sum of much smaller rapid exposures, each of which might fall below a hypothetical dose threshold, allowing the total impact to be zero. Consequently, the results of the Caspari and Stern experiment represented a potentially serious challenge to the single-hit theory.
It was not surprising that the Stern group and experts it consulted, like Muller, were found to have worried in private correspondence about potentially conflicting data, as they did in project reports. Calabrese, on the other hand, thinks Stern's exploration in private correspondence of the strengths and weaknesses in protracted experiments is an indication that his final resolution of the situation must have been dishonest, and not the normal wrestling with puzzling data (Calabrese, 2015 at 434-435) . Professor Calabrese's evidence for dishonesty, however, does not derive from his quotations from correspondence, but, as I discuss in Section 4, from his misreading of a report by Stern and Uphoff, which supposedly concedes bias and lack of interpretability.
Replication
Given the potential contradiction between experiments, replication was undertaken by Uphoff and Stern, with the results reported in Science magazine in June of 1949 (Uphoff and Stern, 1949) . Their paper appeared three months after an article on genetics had been published by physicist and nuclear medicine pioneer, Robley Evans, that only mentioned the low mutation rate found by Caspari and Stern. Evans stated:
"The possibility therefore exists that the genetic effects per roentgen may be less at very low dosage rates than the effects previously observed at higher dosage rates, where repair or recovery of the gene material has not been observed." (Evans, 1949) .
With Evan's interpretation of the Caspari/Stern work being discussed, and given the intellectual competition that existed between geneticists and physicists/pathologists on dose response (NAS, 1956b at 44, 120, 175, 193, 204, 282, 305-307) , considerable urgency would likely have been felt to publish the results of the Uphoff replications. A discussion of the publication history of underlying reports and journal publications is given in the Supplementary material. Uphoff and Stern (1949) looked at two replications with different dose durations to achieve the 50-r accumulation, 1-day and 21-day. The resulting 1-day induced mutation rate was 0.115%, a bit lower than the Spencer and Stern value of 0.147% determined from the 5-min exposures. The 21-day induced mutation rate was lower (0.078%), but with a low p-value of 0.03, resolving fears for most geneticists that a dose-rate threshold might have been found in the original 21-day study. The low p-value meant that the lower 95% confidence limit was above zero effect.
As a check, Uphoff and Stern (1949) undertook another protracted experiment this time at a higher dose of 100-r. All of the mutation rate results from the Stern group up to 150-r have been plotted in Fig. 1 , accompanied by count-rate standard errors (NCSS, 2016) . Under a single-hit model, it should not matter whether exposure is protracted or sudden. Only cumulative dose matters. Thus, supporters of the LNT would expect all the data points in Fig. 1 to fall on a straight line going through the origin, with deviations due only to experimental error. To obtain the LNT line, I fit the data using a linear model with zero intercept. Two of the three 21-day protracted exposures (triangles) lie below the line; two of the three 5-min exposures (diamonds) lie above the line. If there is some multi-hit effects in this dose range, the possibility can be tested by looking for quadratic effects in the dose response.
As for regression results, the p-value for a 1-parameter model with a linear term and no intercept (LNT) is 0.0002, which is supportive of a 1-hit model. Adding a quadratic term does not improve the model fit, with the p-value for the quadratic term=0.3, suggesting the absence of multi-hit contributions. If an intercept is allowed, the p-value for the linear slope is 0.02, with the intercept intersecting the axis at a positive mutation rate, suggesting that the LNT with its intersection at zero might under-predict response at low doses, rather than reveal a threshold. Certainly, someone who took the LNT as the default hypothesis would find the overall picture in the plot and fits consistent with the LNT, albeit with data points above and below the linear curve.
Nevertheless, someone whose default hypothesis was a threshold dose-response, and who was not impressed by a linear fit to a function they believed to be highly non-linear, would be unlikely to change any of their opinions, based on Fig. 1 . They might see too much spread to make the data useful for establishing a reliable model fit.
Calabrese claims in his writings that the Uphoff and Stern (1949) replications were biased and experimentally unsound (Calabrese, 2015 at 434-436) . He thinks Delta Uphoff was inexperienced (See Supplementary material for a rebuttal). He claims that the Spencer and Stern 5-min dose-duration results were unreliable due to "critical methodological limitations" (Calabrese, 2011a ) (without considering the subsequent study by Shiomi et al. (Shiomi et al., 1963) , which gave results down to 8 r consistent with the slope predicted by the data of Spencer and Stern). Calabrese only praises the Caspari and Stern (1948) study, and his language in some of his writings (Calabrese, 2015 at 432) implies that their study provided evidence of a (dose-rate) threshold, when in fact it gave a positive value, as noted by Russell (Russell, 1952) . In fact, the Caspari and Stern results were consistent with both zero and positive threshold values. In total, the preceding studies to which he objects are the highest three data points at 50-r in Fig. 1 , as well as the data point at 25-r. A trend line through the data points remaining after these rejections would have a steeper slope than the line shown on Fig. 1 and make a threshold look plausible.
What about the spread in the 4 data points at 50-r? All 4 data points are plotted in Fig. 2 , along with 95% confidence intervals generated from the raw mutation count numbers provided in Uphoff and Stern, using standard software for analyzing proportions (NCSS, 2016). Note that for Fig. 1 , the error bars were 1-standard deviations, which is typical for dose-response plots. When looking at deviations of individual studies, as in Fig. 2 , it is standard to use 90 or 95% confidence intervals.
Two groups of 50-r accumulated doses are shown in the Figure, those with dose durations less than or equal to 1-day and those with dose durations of 21-days. (The right most groups have been dithered to enhance visibility.) When looked at with confidence limits in place, the measurements in each group do not seem at all inconsistent. For instance, the difference between the 21-day results from Uphoff/Stern and the 21-day results recorded by Caspari/Stern turns out to be only three-quarters of a standard deviation, which is well inside the~2-standard deviations from zero that defines each of the 95% confidence limits (Reed, 1936) . The same is true for the differences between the 5-min and 1-day delivery results of Spencer and Stern (1948) and Uphoff and Stern (1949) , respectively. The consistency of the measurements makes it hard to justify Calabrese's discarding of three of the four data sets.
Such agreement suggests averaging or pooling the similar values, as one generally does with multiple measurements to get lower percentage errors. When I averaged the 21-day results, the mean rate turned out to be 0.058%, with the lower 95%-confidence limit not reaching zero effect. This means that the result from the combined experiments does not support zero response, i.e. it does not support a dose-rate threshold, using the statistical criteria of the day (95%-confidence limits). When I pooled the raw data from both 21-day experiments, which is a statistically better approach than averaging, the mean rate was slightly lower, with a value of 0.053% and a confidence interval of (0.0062, 0.1). The p-value was 0.025. Once again, the lower, 95%-confidence limit was greater than zero, and thus not consistent with the dose-rate threshold that Calabrese claims. I note that Stern, Uphoff and colleagues did decide several years later to average the data from Caspari and Stern (1948) and Uphoff and Stern (1949) , as part of a 1952 study (Stern et al., 1952) .
What about the quality of the 21-day original and replicant experiments? Both appear at first sight to have problems with control data, as I now discuss. The replicated results, to which Calabrese objects (Calabrese, 2016 at 538) , are based on a total control rate that seemed low based on the control rates of some other studies, but Uphoff and Stern (1949) ultimately concluded that the true variation must be large, not that their control rate was invalid.
"The new data on the control mutation rate in aged sperm suggest considerable variation of age accumulation of mutations in the Fig. 1 . Plot of radiation-induced, mutation data from the Stern group. Data from Spencer and Stern (1948) and Uphoff and Stern (1949) . Error bars are standard deviations, range~½ 95% CI. 95% CI based on two-proportion count statistics (NCSS, 2016) . Triangular points are 21-day exposures. The diamonds are 5-min (or less) exposures. The one circular data point indicates the result for the 1-day exposure. The trend line is the LNT prediction (slope fit to all of the data points, with intercept at zero). Fig. 2 . Four measurements of radiation-induced, mutation frequency by the Stern group at 50-r. Data from Uphoff and Stern (1949) . 95% confidence limits are based on twoproportion count statistics (NCSS, 2016) . The points at 21 days duration have been dithered for clarity.
Canton Special stock on which all tests were carried out." (Uphoff and Stern, 1949) Calabrese sees things differently, saying: "Stern then had Uphoff undertake a follow up replication study. She again reported a similar unacceptably low control group response." (Calabrese, 2015 at 435) To investigate this discrepancy in views between Calabrese and the researchers, I computed the average and variance of seven equivalent, contemporaneous measurements (Table S-2) . The low, 21-day control rate was within 1.2 standard deviations of the mean, well within the 95%-confidence range, eliminating any real concern about the control rates being "unacceptably" low, thereby supporting Uphoff and Stern's conclusion about considerable variation, and failing to support Calabrese on this point. (I discuss in Section 4.0 a charge by Calabrese about a low control rate in the first month of the Uphoff and Stern 1-day experiment).
The original study by Caspari and Stern, the one acceptable to Calabrese, has possible internal inconsistencies in the monthly control data for two months (Fig. S-2a , Table S-3). However, the discrepancy disappeared (where it mattered) in the treatment/control difference. I found no stragglers in the probability plot ( Fig. S-2-b) , suggesting that any problems in those two monthly measurements were non-differential.
It should be recognized that the experiments carried out by both Uphoff and Caspari had a particularly robust design. Monthly experiments were carried out, allowing for assessment of monthly variability using statistical tests for non-randomness in variations. For each month, batches of fruit flies could be divided between treatment and controls, fed the same diet under conditions designed to be identical, except for the irradiation. Many variations that could change results would affect both treatment and controls, preserving the direction of the difference. Furthermore, with separate batches of fruit flies studied each month, these protracted experiments consisted of 7-8 monthly replications. (Note that this replication advantage did not hold for the Spencer and Stern data, for which there was but one control data set used to compare multiple short-term irradiations at different dosages. The Spencer and Stern work had other merits, namely internal controls. The multiple dosages they used determined a dose response curve, which meant that, in effect, each dose point could be considered an internal control for the others).
In any case, pooling the 21-day results bypasses the subjective argument about which protracted study is better. The combined 21-day results have a comfortable separation from zero effect, making it hard to disagree with the conclusion of the study by Uphoff and Stern (1949) that there is no threshold indicated by their data.
If I see limitations in this work and how it was interpreted by the genetics community, it is the implication that the Caspari and Stern study (1948) must have been methodologically wrong, as well as the lack of interest shown in considering data pooling or averaging, as a sensitivity test, if nothing else. (As previously stated, the two sets of data were finally averaged in a 1952 (Stern et al., 1952) .) I also note that presentation of 95% confidence limits around the mutation rates would have been helpful to readers.
Based on the above graphs and statistical analysis, I conclude that the paper of Uphoff and Stern (1949) was not hiding anything or misstating results when it declared, "There is no threshold below which radiation fails to induce mutations." This is a perfectly logical statement for two geneticists to make, given their default hypothesis steeped in hit theory, which predicts a relatively smooth dose-response function. On the other hand, polynomial fits are not always considered to be informative, in my experience, by those who have a default hypothesis predicting a rapidly changing dose response, implicit in threshold or hormesis behavior. They want to see data points above zero at the 95% confidence level all the way down to zero dose; otherwise they will not be willing to concede the absence of a threshold. Hence, intelligent scientists can disagree over the implications of the same data. Today, it is expected that the slope of the genetic LNT for humans is reduced by a factor of 3 for protracted exposures (NAS, 2006) . With this hindsight, it would be natural to draw a trend line on the graph in Fig. 2 . The resulting straight line fit, which was not considered in the 1949 summary paper, has a p-value of 0.1, which does not reach the 95% significance level that held sway in the 1950s as a bright-line criterion, but it is suggestive of a trend. The numerical value of the reduction was 2.2, which is similar to the factor of 3 mentioned above that is used today for genetic risk calculations (NAS, 2006) . It would be tempting, given current knowledge about genetic dose-rate reduction factors, to think that Uphoff and Stern (1949) had been the first to discover the effect, but there are two reasons to be skeptical. First, the 21-day experiments involved only irradiation of spermatozoa (stored in the spermatheca of the female). Subsequent investigators found that, in mice, dose-rate reductions were moderated or non-existent unless the spermatogonia or oogonia were irradiated (Russell et al., 1958) . A second reason involves the lack of dose-rate dependence found at 100 r in the separate experiment carried out by Uphoff and Stern that was also reported in their 1949 paper (shown in Fig. 1 ). It seems too convenient to think that the break point would occur between 50 and 100 r.
What about the possibility of extrapolating the trendline in Fig. 2 out to longer durations to reach a dose-rate threshold? It would not make sense, because the mean lifetime of fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) is only a few days more than the 21 days used in the protracted exposures (Hollingsworth et al., 1978) . Similarly, the short lifespan precludes the possibility of experiments going out further in time with fruit flies.
The low dose data in Fig. 1 were consistent with the LNT and hit theory, within experimental errors, Also, the spread in the 50-r, 21-day results was sufficiently small to be consistent with the 5-min and 1-day results at the 95%-confidence limit, considering only Poisson count errors without consideration of additional experimental errors that were likely to be present. Nevertheless, at the suggestion of a reviewer, I fit dose response functions from target theory (zero intercept, linear and/or quadratic term) to the three 21-day data points alone, with and without the 1-day data point included. Either a linear or quadratic term, when fit to these small number of data points produced a p-value less than 0.05, but with quadratic fits giving the best p-values, supporting a sublinear dose response. At the same time, in light of the analysis of Bonnier and Luning that rapidly delivered doses produced supralinear responses in both their's and the Spencer/Stern data, I also fit the rapid-delivery data points in Fig. 1 to a linear plus quadratic model, with and without the 1-day data point. In these cases, the quadratic term was negative ( p-value of 0.04 and 0.07, respectively), supporting the idea of a supralinear response for rapid exposures.
No one at the time plotted dose-response curves for protracted exposure separately, as far as I can tell from reviewing the fruit fly literature, so I cannot say with any certainty how geneticists of the time would have reacted to the idea of fitting curves, separately, to the protracted data. However, if the lack of attention to the work by Bonnier and Luning is any guide, nothing would have been done experimentally about it. For one reason, it would have been difficult, in hopes of filling out the dose-response curve, to go to cumulative doses lower than those used by the Stern group, because background mutations were too high (NAS, 1955 at 13). Interest in dose response for genetic effects has dwindled, now that cancer outcomes are considered to be the more frequent consequence of radiation exposure (Beyea, 2016d) . The cancer LNT is studied on its own, today, using human epidemiological data, which show comparable cancer risks for both rapid and protracted exposure at 50 r and to a debated degree below 50-r (Beyea, 2012; Leuraud et al., 2015; Richardson et al., 2015) .
How might these separate fits to subsets of the fruit fly data shown in Fig. 1 play out in the current debate over dose response? To begin with, it would be myopic and biased to focus on but one of the discordant results. At face value, the separate fits to data after grouping by duration of exposure imply a supralinear response for the faster dose rates and sublinear responses for dose delivered over a period of 21-days or longer. I am not aware of any mechanistic model for such behavior, so this would be a new hypothesis, not confirmation of any dose response model being debated today. And, with so little data, focusing on results from separate fits could be criticized as reading too much into messy genetic data and too much picking out of subsets that catch the eye, especially in the absence of a mechanistic model. To sum up: the Stern group's experiments both extended the lowest dose at which linearity had been found and also threatened for a time to upend the prediction of target theory that no dose-rate effects would show up, once doses were low enough to reveal linearity in dose. Until 1958, there was no data supporting a genetic dose-rate reduction factor, and the Stern group's data as a whole was consistent with linearity, within experimental errors. Before the 1956 committee deliberated, the only non-linear possibility put forward within the genetics community concerning low doses was a chemical saturation idea that Bonnier and Luning mentioned to possibly explain their report of a supralinear dose response (see Section 5.0), which was the opposite of a threshold. To the best of the geneticist's knowledge in this time period, there was neither a dose-rate reduction factor nor a threshold in protracted exposure. Possibly, there were hints of doserate effects, such as would later be discovered with mice, but no one investigated lower protracted doses in fruit flies, which would have been very difficult to do given that fruit fly experiments had been taken down to the lowest dose that seemed practical given background mutation rates.
Misreading of the earlier Uphoff and Stern report (1947) leads to character attacks
Looked at with an eye on confidence limits and statistically small differences between mutation rates, it is hard to understand why anyone would worry much about the differences between the original and replicated experiments, particularly because by 1956 early data on mice was available that soon would completely replace fruit fly data for estimating risk to humans. Now, Calabrese thinks key actors, Curt Stern and future committee member, Herman Muller, knew that the Uphoff and Stern replication data (Uphoff and Stern, 1947) were flawed (Calabrese, 2016 at 537, 538) . He thinks Stern said as much in the 1947 report and Muller in correspondence, and they pretended that it was the Caspari and Stern (1948) data that were flawed. All for a nefarious agenda, supposedly, of supporting the LNT for political purposes, which are not stated. According to Calabrese's narrative, Stern and Muller concealed that information about the supposed Uphoff flaw, which led to the 1956 NAS committee being misled, which led to the EPA endorsing the LNT for chemical pollutants, which led to unduly conservative regulation, which led to useless expenditures and the possible loss of positive health benefits according to his hormesis theory. (Calabrese, 2015 at 432, 437, 440; at 537, 538) His long string of inferences start with his original charge of ethics violation and his claim that Stern admitted in a 1947 report about the first replication (1-day duration) that his co-author had introduced personal bias. This sounds absurd on its face, and it is, once the actual language is read, which any reader can check, by opening the link in the citation to the report (Uphoff and Stern, 1947 at 3) .
Here is the passage in the report that Calabrese has seized upon, apparently missing the words I have put in italics:
"The earliest control value is particularly low, and the question may be raised whether at this initial stage of the project it may reflect a personal bias of the experimenter. It is unlikely that this is the case." (Uphoff and Stern, 1947 at 3). (Emphasis added.) Professor Calabrese has missed the word, "earliest," incorrectly concluding that the concern was directed in this section at the total control value (which I have addressed earlier and in Table S -2). He missed the word, "may," writing instead ) that the report said there "was" experimenter bias. And most important, he missed the crucial phrase, "It is unlikely that this is the case," which the authors proceeded to demonstrate using a chi-square statistical test.
In other words, based on the actual language in the text, there was no reason to treat the month with the low mutation rate as an outlier, as I confirmed with a probability plot (Fig. S-3) , which showed the low value right on the normal curve. Uphoff and Stern (1947) had anticipated a question that might rise to a reader's mind (as it did in mine upon first seeing the one low value out of seven in the Table) . But, here is how Calabrese (mis)translates the passage:
"That is, Stern, Muller, Caspari and Uphoff had characterized the Uphoff control group data in her first two key studies as being inappropriate, making her data uninterpretable, leading her mentor Curt Stern to write in the discussion of their manuscript that this was due to investigator bias, a sharp rebuke to Uphoff, while also protecting himself." (Emphasis added) This is not reliable historical analysis. Calabrese gets it backwards and then goes on to rely on his misreading to condemn Stern even further:
"Despite this rather striking written criticism, Stern would find a way to rescue the spate of uninterpretable data, for as we would come to learn, he was not only an expert in genetics but in data camouflaging as well, all in an effort to preserve the LNT single-hit theory …" (Calabrese, 2016)} (Emphasis added.)
Notice how Calabrese has filled out his narrative with details inferred from his misreading of the text. He has decided that the language in the joint report must have been Stern's alone and that it must have constituted a rebuke of his coauthor. He infers motives for Stern. This misreading of Uphoff and Stern (1947) and his accusations based upon it go back to 2011 (Calabrese, 2011a) and are repeated many times in his subsequent publications. In the first paper in which the attack appears (Calabrese, 2011a) , Calabrese actually quotes the part of the passage in which the word, bias, occurs, but leaves out the succeeding sentence that contained the "unlikely" part. Had he found such an omission in the work of those he opposes, I can imagine the blistering condemnation, the inferring of motives, and the research misconduct charges that would have followed.
If stories are to be made up, consider Uphoff defending her first month's low result by demonstrating that the value was consistent with a chi-square analysis of all of the months' data. If the value for the low month were to be (inappropriately) dropped, I found that the net impact on the estimated mutation rate from 1-day radiation would decrease by a modest 20%, bringing the value actually closer to the replicated 21-day result.
The 1947 Uphoff and Stern report about the first replication did not say the results were uninterpretable, as Calabrese claims in his recent paper (Calabrese, 2016 at 538) . The report said that additional data would be required to decide between alternative explanations for the difference between the 1-day results and the 21-day results of Caspari and Stern (1948) . And that data soon followed as the Stern group collected data for the second replication, this time for a 21-day exposure duration, with the results reported in the 1949 Uphoff and Stern Science article.
Given this example of lapses in textual interpretation by Calabrese and his willingness to leap to ad hominem remarks about the ethics of historical figures based on inferences from his own interpretations of obscure sources, readers should be skeptical of any accusatory statements he makes about the ethics of historical figures, such as H.J. Muller, Bentley Glass, Detlov Bronk, James Crow and Warren Weaver, that have not been vetted by an independent assessment of the relevant correspondence, transcripts, and reports.
Problematic elements and limitations are not surprising when researchers, like the Stern group, are working at the forefront of their science. Statistical and internal evidence presented here suggests that, despite the obstacles and questions, all of the studies obtained reasonable results. None should be discarded from consideration. As a result, it is not true that "cancer risk assessment policy and practices are based on fraud and deception by key leaders of the radiation geneticist community," as Calabrese has claimed (Calabrese, 2015 at 440).
1949-1956. The immediate period before the 1956 NAS committee report
After the 1948 Caspari study there were limited challenges to the LNT in fruit fly mutations. There was one supralinear dose response reported, with four data points on the curve (Bonnier and Lüning, 1949) . Carter and Phillips describe the possible implications of this study:
"If it is generally true and not merely a peculiarity of the loci studied by Bonnier and Luning, it suggests that the slope of the effect/dose curve may be much higher, in the important part of the range…….than expected on the basis of a strictly linear law." (Carter and Phillips, 1952 ) (See Fig. S-4) I note that, in a 2013 paper (Calabrese, 2013a) , Calabrese interpreted the Bonnier and Luning paper as supporting a threshold in the low dose region, when the effect of their claim was just the opposite, as Carter and Phillips state in the above quotation. In a second paper, Bonnier and Luning claim that the Spencer and Stern dose response curve also shows the behavior they find (the intercept of the linear fit being greater than zero). Because the Bonnier and Luning extrapolated curve was well above the background level, the curve in reality would have to come down at lower doses ( Fig. S-4) , which is the hallmark of a supralinear response. See Supplementary material (S-6.0) for details.
However, the Bonnier work had its critics. Catcheside felt there were problems with controls (Catcheside, 1952) . In any case, this finding of a supralinear dose response in fruit flies appears to have been rarely mentioned and taken no more seriously in the end, it appears, than were the opposite claims by Singleton of a threshold in plants for some but not all endpoints, as discussed later. Because of ever-present, experimental error, it would not have been found surprising by geneticists of the day that some studies varied from the theoretically expected curves.
Of more concern was the fact that the linearity in fruit flies extended to high doses. Muller et al. (1954d) speculated that linearity of mutations at the higher doses, but not the lower doses, occurred because of two competing effects (Muller et al., 1954d) .
Fruit fly publications appeared during the 1948-1956 period showing linearity with neutron dose (King and Wood, 1955; Mickey, 1954; Muller, 1954c) ; also with beta-ray dose (King, 1954) . Genetic effects on fruit flies from atom bomb radiation were also reported in this period (Ives et al., 1954) , an indication of the social concerns that would likely have been on the minds of the participants of the 1956 NAS committee. Studies on grasshoppers continued to support linearity (Ray-Chaudhuri and Sarkar, 1952) . These authors also found that dose rate did not matter when exposure was spread out over a 1-day period at 80 r total. An 80 r dose is not that much higher than the 50 r studied by the Stern group.
In a puzzling fruit fly study, Edington found a non-linear contribution to the dose response for x-rays but not neutrons and gamma rays (Edington, 1956 ). Bentley Glass found linearity up to 2000 r in special endpoints ("Minute" (M) mutants), with a faster increase with dose above 2000 r, which he attributed to an increasing proportion of double hit mechanisms (Glass, 1955) .
Early work on mutations induced in mice was reported in this period, with Russell stating in a 1951 paper that mice were much more sensitive to radiation than fruit flies (Russell, 1951) .
Were there biological dose thresholds found in plant mutations that the 1956 NAS committee should have recognized?
All of the plant studies that Calabrese cites in his papers as evidence of dose thresholds rely on eyeball determinations either by him or by the authors. This is not a substitute for statistical analysis, as I show using a number of examples (Giles, 1940; Singleton, 1954; Sparrow and Singleton, 1953; Stadler, 1930) . Consider first the claim that a 1940 study by Giles of spontaneous mutations in Tradescantia showed a threshold response for chromosome aberrations. In fact, there were too few mutations at the relevant dose to say anything about a biologic threshold. Specifically, there were 3 mutations counted, of which the expected LNT contribution from radiation was only 0.7 mutations, as I calculated from the LNT slope given in the paper (Giles, 1940) . This makes Calabrese's threshold designation statistically invalid, given the Poisson variance around a count of 3.
Count rates were low in the experiment because Giles was using a radioactive exposure of intermediate strength: too weak to produce a detectable increase in the mutation rate, but much stronger than delivered by natural background radiation. The fact that such an exposure did not produce a detectable increase in mutation rate meant that natural background radiation could not produce the spontaneous mutations in plants, a result of scientific interest.
Another example that shows the importance of accounting for count statistics is a study of micronuclei frequency in Maize by Sparrow and Singleton (Sparrow and Singleton, 1953 ). Calabrese claims this study was not properly described to the 1956 NAS committee by one of its members, Bernard Kaufmann, because he did not mention the low mutation count rate at a dose point of 0.084 r/d (1.3 r over 16 days). Kaufmann did not mislead his fellow committee members, because the expected additional count rate according to the LNT model was small compared to the Poisson noise in the background count, as I calculated. Therefore, this data point was consistent with an LNT, requiring no attention.
A third paper cited for a genetic threshold in plants is Stadler (1930) , but the authors discounted the likelihood of a real threshold based on unpublished data; moreover the 3.3 count prediction for the three lowest dosage points expected by the LNT lies within the 95% confidence Poisson limit of 3.6, as I calculated. Nevertheless, this mutation study does provide some evidence for a threshold in a plant species, specifically barley, although a 1956 study did not find a threshold in the same plant (Nybom et al., 1956 ).
Ralph Singleton and thresholds in plants
Calabrese's main support for a threshold comes from the work and views of one author, Ralph Singleton, primarily from an experiment in the 1954 paper that Singleton authored by himself on plant mutations in maize. However, there are major questions about the 1954 paper, particularly about the 5-fold discrepancy between the response data collected in 1950 and that collected in 1952, results that would have been apparent to geneticists of the day looking at the published, combined graph (Fig. S-5 ). There was another discrepancy: Singleton stated that a threshold of 40-r per day existed for the 1952 data and a 10-r per day threshold for the 1950 data. It is hard to believe in a biological threshold that varies from year to year. (Units of exposure were in r-per-day, because the authors found these units a better exposure marker than total r, when duration of exposure was varied. If the exposure duration was kept the same, it would make no difference).
When Nybom and collaborators in Sweden tried to replicate the work in barley using their gamma source, no such effect was found, leading them to wonder if the unusual high rate of natural background mutations in maize was responsible for Singleton's results (Nybom et al., 1956) . Nor did Singleton himself replicate the results from the 1952 dataset in subsequent publications (See Fig. S-6 ) (Konzak and Singleton, 1956; Richter and Singleton, 1955) .
Even without considering the methodological discrepancies, there is a question of the relevance of plant studies to humans. There were mixed views even among plant geneticists. Thus, for a variety of reasons-the unexplained strangeness of the Singleton data, the question of importance to human risk, and the failure to replicate-it is understandable that Singleton's claims about thresholds would not have been sufficient to reverse the 1956 NAS committee's consensus about linearity of mutations and dose given all the other studies.
"Generally, Singleton's results were ignored by the genetics community-not because of his affiliation with the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission], though his threshold result would have been a godsend for the agency, but because they contradicted long accepted scientific assumptions about radiation genetics, as well as because of methodological issues." (Jolly, 2003 at 299) I checked the visual assessment made by Singleton for the existence of a threshold. I expanded his graphs in both the 1953 (Fig. S-7a to c) and 1954 papers (Fig. S-8a to c) and fitted the raw data at the lowest doses measured to linear, quadratic, and linear+quadratic models. In most cases, the linear model performed best; in one case (1952 data) a quadratic model performed best (Fig. S-8c ). The p-value was not improved by fitting to a sum of linear and quadratic terms, because the penalty for the extra degree of freedom was too high. See Table S-1 for the p-value results.
Only the case with the quadratic fit for 1952 data ( Fig. S-8c ) does better than a linear fit, supporting the visual interpretation and Calabrese's idea that the LNT would overestimate doses when extrapolating to doses below the lowest measured value. This makes this one Singleton case a potential outlier with his other studies (e.g., 1950 data results) and the great number of other studies in fruit flies and plants that support the linear model. Actually, a quadratic fit would have been interpreted as a sign of a two hit effect, which is ultimately how Singleton himself came to see it after 1956 (Singleton, 1962 at 406) .
On the other hand, even when a linear fit is preferred, the quadratic fits are still generally reasonable, which makes the Singleton plant datasets capable of supporting both linear and non-linear default hypotheses. I note that Singleton did not serve on the genetics committee. With his plant background, he served on the 1956 NAS agriculture committee, which focused primarily on the potential impact of nuclear war on the food supply.
Summary of the scientific basis for the LNT, at the time of the 1956 NAS committee's deliberation
As I have indicated in the above sections, a large number of pre-1956 experimental papers and reviews supported genetic linearity and, in combination with theoretical analyses, supported the absence of a threshold for genetic damage. There were outlier studies, but they primarily gave results suggestive of supra-linearity at lower doses (Bonnier and Lüning, 1949; Bonnier et al., 1949; Muller, 1927 Muller, , 1928 Schultz, 1936; Weinstein, 1928) . The key replication by Uphoff & Stern of the lowest dose outlier (Caspari & Stern) was not biased as Calabrese claims (Section 4).
The LNT fit fell in the middle of the experimental data, as would be expected of any valid model. Bear in mind that experimental error beyond mutation count statistics must be taken into account, when judging the scatter around the default model. On the theoretical side, target theory had no room for a threshold. As one 1956 NAS committee member, Sturtevant, said in an April 1955 letter to a scientist with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (Hamblin, 2007) , ''Theory gives no basis for a threshold, and experiment does not suggest it." I note that this strong support for the no-threshold theory was written six-months before the genetics committee first met. No shift in views, here.
Target theory did have room for powers of dose greater than one, but once a dose was low enough to show linearity, doses below that point would also show a linear, rate-independent effect down to zero dose. The 1956 NAS genetics report did not discuss target theory, single hits, or dose response for multiple hits. The report made simplifications:
"The simplifications and abbreviations which have been adopted in this report in order to achieve a generally understandable presentation will undoubtedly be recognized by, and it is hoped will not disturb, the more technical reader." (NAS, 1956a) . "It should be understood that many of the statements made in this report would require various qualifications and a lot more detail to attain full technical precision." (NAS, 1956a) . "It is felt that the subject is important enough so that many citizens will wish to make the effort which is necessary to a careful reading of this report." (NAS, 1956a) .
The report already contained substantial discussion of radiation genetics for a general audience to absorb. Given the assumption that fruit flies were a better surrogate for humans than plants and given the huge range over which the dose response was linear in fruit flies, there would have seemed little benefit from adding still more detail to address dose response at high doses. Consequently, the established science of the times was reported fairly in the report as the best of current knowledge; the explanation was largely consistent with the best of current knowledge today for low doses of the type being considered by the committee (Beyea, 2016d) ). And, based on the excerpts from the report that I reproduce in Section 8.1, the large uncertainty around genetic damage estimates was well covered, not hidden. There was no misrepresentation of the research record, as Calabrese charges (Calabrese, 2015 at 440) .
Calabrese apparently thought that the Committee should have justified their views over that of the pathologists, radiologists and physicists who believed in thresholds (Calabrese, 2016 at 536) , rather than provide a primer on radiation genetics for non-specialists, which is what the genetics committee essentially chose to do. Calabrese is entitled to his personal opinion, but it might have been more balanced to have informed the reader that the genetics committee in its report offered to provide more "detail and factual justification, if this is later desired by any of the agencies…which have responsibility for the procedures and standards to which our recommendations apply." (Presumably, this would have required contracting with the NAS to pay for managing such an extended report. Committee members serve without pay).
The historical evidence offered by Calabrese is a limited number of studies that, on review, fail to provide support for a genetic threshold, but for a few exceptions. Geneticist authors and reviewers of the period would have known this.
Calabrese speaks of assumptions made by geneticists with their LNT (Calabrese, 2016 at 537-538, 545) . But what of those assumptions made by non-geneticists in support of a threshold? He is mute on that subject. And he only addresses possible funding conflicts of interest among genetic researchers on the committee, not among any researcher not on the committee who might have advocated a threshold or compensatory effect for carcinogenesis. As a result, the approach taken by Calabrese appears to me to be unbalanced.
Did the 1956 genetics committee report suppress calculations of some of its members and suppress the internal debate?
According to Professor Calabrese, in an act of fraud and deception, the committee left out numerical estimates of three committee members in one of its damage calculations (Calabrese, 2016 at 548) . Although this claim does not speak to the shape of the LNT model, only to the magnitude of the linear slope, the accusation casts doubt on the integrity of the committee, which might make a reader more likely to accept accusations about the form of the genetic dose response, including the no-threshold part. Irrespective of the LNT, this issue forms a major basis for Calabrese's charges that the committee (panel) engaged in scientific misconduct (Calabrese, 2015 at 438; Calabrese, 2016 at 541) . As I will argue, his views are inconsistent with those in the detailed thesis by Christopher Jolly on which I have relied. Furthermore, Calabrese's views are based on his claim that some numerical estimates were withheld from the report, when there is a simple explanation on close reading of the text.
Here is how Calabrese understands the matter:
"The factual record therefore indicates that while the BEAR I Genetics Panel stated in their Science journal article that only six geneticists "considered the problem", nine actually did. In fact, the nine geneticists did far more than simply "consider" the problem, each provided detailed written estimates.
The "problem" for those of us who analyze the report, is that there were three types of estimates considered by committee members in what amounts to an early effort at "expert elicitation." Not all geneticists responded to the three numerical requests.
As Jolly wrote:
"Nine panel members submitted calculations on the genetic effects of additional radiation exposure. Seven of them calculated the total genetic damage from 10 r to a population of 160,000,000." (Jolly, 2003) . (Emphasis added.)
The seventh geneticist was apparently Wright, who would not in the end "be party to this particular activity," as Beatty put it (Beatty, 2006 at 63), which leaves us with the six geneticists mentioned in the report. Calabrese apparently wanted the committee to combine all the damage estimates regardless of the fact that two of the estimates were for a different problem (tangible mutations, as opposed to total mutations). In any case, the committee did not suppress the other two calculations; they contribute to a separate estimate for tangible mutations appearing in the report (NAS, 1956a at 25) .
The three types of estimates considered were: 1) Tangible or visible mutations to the first generation, representing only a fraction of the total number of mutations induced in the first generation. Although Calabrese never mentions it, the report pegged this number at 50,000 after a 10-r dose to a population of 100 million (NAS, 1956a at 25) . This is the number that would be expected to incorporate Calabrese's "missing" two estimates (by Demerec and Kaufman) as part of a calculation of (presumably) a geometric mean. (See Table S -4 and related discussion.) I note that 50,000 for tangibles in the first generation is consistent with modern day estimates (Beyea, 2016d Table 2 ). 2) A second estimate considered by the committee was total mutations to the first generation. The report pegged this number at 5 million for the 10-r exposure (NAS, 1956a at 27), based on the views of sixgeneticists, while noting that other geneticists did not think this was a meaningful exercise (NAS, 1956a at 26) . The numerical estimates made by the six, as tabulated by historian, Beatty, from the primary correspondence (Beatty, 2006 at 63) , are shown in the first set of rows in Table S -4, for which the geometric mean was 5 million, matching the number given in the NAS report. Under the "genetic death" theory, virtually every one of these 5 million mutations would lead eventually to a bad outcome in some later generation.
"Under this view, the total damage is measured by the number of mutations induced by a given increase in radiation, this number to be multiplied in one' s mind by the average damage from a typical mutation." (NAS, 1956a at 18) Therefore, the estimate for total number of mutations in the first generation, both tangible and invisible, was numerically equivalent to the total damage over all generations. The report placed the 5-million number in that context. Later NAS committees would consider this number to be too high (Beyea, 2016d) ; they would side with those committee members who thought this type of estimate, despite its mathematical elegancy, was not meaningful. For one reason, later committees did not think all mutations would lead to an outcome of concern.
Although not described explicitly in the report as a geometric mean, the cited 5-million number is in fact the geometric mean of the six estimates. Geometric means, often calculated from the average of the logarithms of the data, are generally used in risk assessment when numbers range over orders of magnitude (NAS, 1993) . With geometric means, one can speak of a single uncertainty factor up or down. The assumption is that each estimate is more likely to be characterized by a log-normal distribution than a normal one. Furthermore, the meeting transcripts provide an example of James Crow, the designated collector of estimates, using a geometric mean (NAS, 1956b at 126) . Note that the estimates submitted for a population of 160 million were scaled down so as to apply to a population of 100 million.
3) The third estimate considered by some of the committee members was cumulative damage through the tenth generation. (5 geneticists provided such estimates according to a hand-drawn graph by James Crow. The graph is reproduced by Jolly and accessible through the link provided in the citation (Jolly, 2003 at 350) ). Such 10th-generation calculations were discussed in the meeting transcripts as if they would be the main, long-term calculation presented in the report (NAS, 1956b at 241-242), but they ended up not being mentioned in the committee report at all, having been displaced by the genetic death interpretation of total mutations in the first generation. Jolly cites a post-meeting memo by the committee chairman describing the benefits of using the genetic death approach: "The simplicity of the concept would eliminate the need for including a lot of details about degrees of lethality, population genetics, etc." (Jolly, 2003 at 358) .
Based solely on secondary sources written by historians, I have not been able to figure out exactly which committee members' calculations went into generating the 50,000 tangible mutation estimate, but it is clear that Demerec's low estimate must have been one of them. There is no other way that the reported number could be as low as 50,000, because all other estimates that may have contributed were greater than 50,000. See Supplementary material, S-8.1.3.
Calabrese also claims that the committee understated the uncertainty around the estimate made by six of its members, when they assigned only a factor of 10 up or down (Calabrese, 2016 at 540) . However, this charge about understated uncertainty largely evaporates when the geometric mean is used as the mid-point, rather than the arithmetic mean that was used by Calabrese (see Supplementary material at S-8.1.3). The geometric mean calculation leads to a range of 220, not the large 750 value obtained by Calabrese, which means a plus/minus factor of 15. Once again, I note that the geometric mean is appropriate when categorizing the midpoint of numbers that range over many orders of magnitude and when uncertainty is given in terms of factors up and down.
In summary, it appears that Calabrese's charges of "fraud and deception" and "scientific misconduct" for supposed suppression of committee estimates stem from his not identifying the 50,000 (tangibles/visible) figure provided in the report and his focusing on arithmetic averages, rather than geometric means.
Internal debate
Professor Calabrese is critical of the lack of dissent expressed among committee members in the meeting transcripts concerning the nature of the dose response in the low dose region (Calabrese, 2016 at 535) . He suspects this was due in part to a stacked committee. (For a rebuttal, see (Beyea, 2016d at 532) .) To me the agreement, where it existed, is evidence of the fact that the LNT by 1956 had become settled genetic science, when it came to the mathematical shape of the dose response, as I now discuss. But all was not peaceful about some aspects of the LNT. There was definitely a vigorous debate going on among the 1956 NAS committee members, not about the genetic LNT as a theory, but about the slope of the long-term cumulative response in humans.
Here is a list of the six points the committee members agreed to, before they began discussing the contentious part. They agreed on the essence of the linear no threshold theory, namely its functional form: 1) "Radiations cause mutations". 2) "Practically all radiation-induced mutations which have effects large enough to be detected are harmful." (JB: This damage language stopped short enough to avoid entering the committee's disagreement space, which involved the long term impact of small genetic changes.) 3) "Any radiation dose, however small, can induce some mutations". 4) "….there exist mutations which arise from natural causes. We all carry a supply of these spontaneous mutant genes". 5) "To the best of our present knowledge, if we increase the radiation by X%, the gene mutations caused by radiation will also be increased by X%." (Emphasis added.) 6) "What counts, from the point of view of genetic damage, is not the rate; it is the total accumulated dose to the reproductive cells…"
Readers must be careful to separate the uncontested parts of the genetic LNT (zero threshold, linear response) from the contested part (numerical value for the slope of the linear term). This distinction is not made in Calabrese's writings.
As for suppressing the internal debate, there were clear indications written that not all members of the committee thought the total damage risk calculations by six geneticists were meaningful, and the estimate itself was surrounded by caveats. Moreover, because there was disagreement, the total damage risk estimate could not be a basis for any recommendations. The press ignored it. Here is some of the pivotal, compromise language: "This calculation is admittedly somewhat complicated and disappointingly vague. It is, to some geneticists, not a very meaningful way of looking at the problem. To others it adds up to something at least reasonably clear, and in any event very serious." (NAS, 1956a) . "Although the extreme ranges of the estimates differ widely, the mean estimate for any one geneticist is not very different from the mean for any other. Even the "guessing" which is involved hardly deserves that name, for it is based on long years of experience." (NAS, 1956a) . "Concerning these estimates of total number of mutants, three things should be said, First, they are clearly not really satisfactory to any geneticist. Too much has to be assumed, too little is dependably known…… So that the final thing that should be said is that in spite of all the difficulties and complications and ranges in numerical estimates, the result is nevertheless very sobering." (NAS, 1956a).
Thus, dissent was not suppressed, although the heat of the dissent expressed at meetings was not included, which is typical of NAS reports.
9. Did the 1956 NAS committee recommend a "switch" in risk assessment from a genetic threshold model to an LNT model?
Calabrese claims that the genetics committee recommended "that the dose response model for genetic risk assessment be switched from a threshold to a linear model" , but he provides no evidence that there ever was a threshold dose response risk model for genetic risks, as opposed to cancer risks. In 1946, biophysicist Paul Henshaw of the US National Cancer Institute stated (Henshaw, 1946) , "There seems little question but that high-energy radiation in any amount will contribute to a greater frequency of abnormalities in firstgeneration offspring." (Henshaw, 1946) . In 1952, radiologist Robert Stone, in an invited lecture to the Radiological Society of America (Stone, 1952) , had the following comment on threshold, "There is no threshold for genetic mutations and, therefore, any maximum permissible dose is arbitrary." Stone had headed up the Health Division of the Plutonium Project during WWII. He also made another remark that, given the current discussion, I found amusing and possibly relevant:
"The language of the geneticists is to me very difficult. I find it almost impossible to translate or to get them to translate their findings from animal experiments into terms that clarify my thinking relative to problems of human genetics." (Stone, 1952) .
No doubt, there were non-geneticists who, unlike Stone and Henshaw, believed in a threshold for genetic risks, but certainly few geneticists. Implicitly underlying Calabrese's claim about a supposed switch (Calabrese, 2016 at 535, 536, 542 ) must be the assumption that the non-geneticists view of a genetics threshold was more than speculation and had scientific credibility. However, Calabrese does not point to review articles or books in the pre-1956 period that lay out any basis for biologic thresholds in genetic damage. If he is concerned about assuming the genetic model to hold for long-term somatic damage (e.g., cancer), he is looking at the wrong committee. He should be examining the earlier, 1954 report of the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP, 1954) .
The 1956 NAS genetics committee made no suggestion about assuming the genetic LNT for cancer risk; they did not discuss either cancer or life shortening. It was the 1956 NAS pathology committee that covered such subjects, quotes from which are reproduced in the online Supplementary material (S-9.0).
In any case, it is important to stress that there was no switch within the committee. Members of the genetics committee supported the LNT functional form before and after the committee meetings. The committee did not pick between different alternatives; that picking had been done in the genetics literature years before, so the idea that they were induced to favor the LNT over a threshold or other model by dreams of additional funding makes no sense. I note that the most conservative model was not the LNT, it was supra-linearity.
What the genetics committee report did do was to gain public attention for the dominant view of geneticists, what Calabrese has disparagingly called, the geneticist's creed (Calabrese, 2016 at 545) . For the first time, geneticists had a platform equal to that of the pathologists and physicists, with the genetics committee summary report and the pathology committee summary report packaged together in one NAS document (NAS, 1956a) . Moreover, the committee made no explicit recommendation about risk assessment or use of a linear model. They made a finding that, to the best of current understanding, the dose response for genetic damage was linear, but the committee members could not agree on the slope of the linear model. Other than recommending that radiation exposure be tracked and kept as low as necessary, the only explicit, formal recommendation that the committee made was to set exposure standards at specific levels, based on protecting the germline and individuals from genetic risks (NAS, 1956a at 28). Previous standards had been set or maintained based on pathology experience, with some input on occasion from geneticists (NAS, 1956b at 220) . However, the NAS committee's numerical recommendation was not based on an agreed upon, long-term, genetic risk model, as can be confirmed on a reading of the committee transcripts. Committee members agreed on a numerical value for reasons that differed by committee member. For instance, some committee members felt the proposed standard would not be taken seriously, if a lower number were picked (NAS, 1956b at 50, 126).
Others did not want to rule out atomic power (NAS, 1956b at 22, 89, 97) . One member felt that the proposed dose standard would keep the increase in mutations to a fraction of the natural background rate (NAS, 1956b at 127).
The NAS committee followed what had already become recommended practice, namely to set a permissible level of exposure without making the claim that there was zero risk below the standard. The switch from a tolerance (threshold) concept to a permissible dose had already taken place within the regulatory community. As one committee member, radiological physicist, Gioacchino Failla, explained at the Feb 5-6, 1956 committee meeting:
"We changed it to "permissible dose" because it used to be called a "tolerance dose" which indicated that it was tolerable. We changed it to permissible with the definite statement that this will produce some damage but we assume that it is not great." (NAS, 1956b at 91).
Failla had been intimately connected with standard setting in the past. His remarks are consistent with the quotation about report number 17 of the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) that I presented in my first paper. That report was produced two years before the 1956 NAS genetics report appeared.
"In place of the tolerance dose, Report No. 17 introduced the concept of the maximum permissible dose (MPD). Implicit in the MPD was the idea of acceptable risk, and hence a nonthreshold model, the basis for which were the observations of linearity in genetic mutations in Drosophila melanogaster which, for protection purposes, were assumed to also apply to somatic mutations." (Kathren, 1996) . So, as I have said earlier, Calabrese appears to have gone after the wrong committee. And, as I have argued in Section 4, the observations in fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) on which Report 17 relied were not biased as Calabrese has claimed.
Did the 1956 NAS committee change its views out of funding selfinterest?
Putting aside the fact that the NAS committee did not actually switch any personal or community views about the LNT, it is still necessary to respond to the accusation by Calabrese that the 1956 committee's report was modified in the hopes of getting funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. Calabrese states:
"Weaver was clearly aware of the importance of [Rockefeller Foundation] funding to radiation geneticists and showed no reluctance in connecting the Panel's success to opportunities of lavish funding for its members." (See Supplementry material Section S-4.0 for the full Weaver quotation from the meeting transcript, a list of sources of funding for committee members, and a discussion of who influenced whom).
Weaver the chairman of the committee and an officer at the Rockefeller Foundation and past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science made a promise on the record to go to bat for genetics funding, if the case for research came out of the process (NAS, 1956b at 35) . Previously, committee members had made lists of research that would be useful to answer radiobiological questions (NAS, 1956b at 11-14) . However, the committee's report made no such case for increased funding. They did include a motherhood statement about research:
"We should proceed with due caution as regards all agents which cause mutations; and we should vigorously pursue the researches which will in time give us a more precise way of judging all aspects of the risk." And, they included a self-serving pitch for more genetics funding, based on a supposed imbalance compared to funding for atomic and nuclear physics research (NAS, 1956a) .
"The present state of advance in atomic and nuclear physics on the one hand, and in genetics on the other hand, are seriously out of balance. We badly need to know much more about genetics -about all kinds and all levels of genetics, from the most fundamental research on various lowly forms of life to human radiation genetics. This requires serious contributions of time, of brains, and of money. Although brains and time are more important than money, the latter is also essential; and our society should take prompt steps to see to it that the support of research in genetics is substantially expanded and that it is stabilized."
Both of these statements and informal recommendations about research are so generic that they would likely have been made regardless of any findings about dose response and regardless of any promise by Weaver. Despite the plea for genetic research, the report did not make a strong policy case for increased funding of geneticists; just the reverse. No argument was made that the situation was so uncertain that more research was needed before standards could be set or before anything definite could be said about risk.
If the committee had wanted to drum up support for genetics research, the report could have made a case for serious uncertainty, for instance, supporting the view of member, Demerec, who thought more research was needed before any exposure standard should be recommended (NAS, 1956b at 146) . Or, they could have focused on uncertainty of risk and they could have pressured funders with talk of the need to resolve the reports of supra-linearity. Instead, the committee recommended an exposure standard without calling for more research to justify its value. Committee member, James Neel, feared at one point that picking a numerical value would be "seized upon and used in a way that we will regret, actually having a stultifying effect on research which is so urgently needed." (NAS, 1956b at 78 ). Yet, the committee went forward with its numerical recommendation.
From my experience on NAS committees, I can testify to the seriousness with which members take the responsibility handed to them, the intensity with which different factions argue, and the struggles that take place to find caveats and precise wording that will lead to report acceptance by all members. And I see all of these elements in the meeting transcripts and detectable in the language of the final report. (For additional discussion of the NAS committee process, see Supplementary material, S-3.0.) Certainly, scientists tend to see research and the funding of science as positive social goods. No doubt funders of science, do so as well. Because researchers must seek and maintain research funding, it is always possible to raise suspicions about their faithfulness to the science. Even scientists working for government need to worry about their funding, because appropriations are not guaranteed. Interest in increased research funding is found throughout the scientific world. (1956 committee members' diverse funding sources, including the Carnegie Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, are listed in the Supplementary material at S-4.0).
Calabrese says, "Thus, the Panel had the motive, the means and opportunity to carry out these deceptions." . This kind of logic could be used against every scientific committee producing a report. The members need research dollars or favor a particular theory (motive) and they produce a report (means and opportunity). So, the only substantive part of the accusation is deception. (As I have shown, there were no deceptions on the part of the 1956 genetics committee.) Calabrese's method of claiming motive, means, and opportunity can also be applied to insinuate nefarious actions to every individual researcher, anyone who has a need for funding or who favors a particular theory (motive) and then produces an article or reviews a paper (means and opportunity). Calabrese insinuates exactly this in the case of Hermann Muller (Calabrese, 2015) . Not very helpful. Insinuations like this could be made about me and reviewers; they could be made about Calabrese. Indeed, in the social science literature, they have already been made about Calabrese in connection with his industry funding (Shrader-Frechette, 2010 , well before he accused the 1956 committee of conflict of interest. Calabrese didn't start discussions of funding influence. Nevertheless, such insinuations in scientific journals distract from the scientific issues.
As I have shown in the previous section, the NAS committee did not change any views; it reported the general view of radiation geneticists in the US and the world. Calabrese implies that the committee should have known the dose response was not linear and was suggestive of a threshold. If true, this could raise suspicions about the committee's motives, but the prior genetics literature does not support Calabrese's view, as I have argued earlier.
What evidence does Calabrese have that actual committee members changed their views to enhance funding? The only circumstantial evidence he reports is correspondence in 1957 from a researcher, Theodosius Dobzhansky. This correspondence with Demerec is discussed in detail in Seltzer's dissertation (Seltzer, 2007 at 303-306) . In it, Dobzhansky indicates his willingness to "stretch a point" for the sake of genetic research, and implies, it seems, that others might be doing the same on the second NAS genetics committee. Stretching a point for genetic research is not the "deliberate misrepresentation of the research record in order to enhance an ideological agenda" and not the "fraud and deception" that Calabrese pins on the 1956 NAS committee (Calabrese, 2015 at 432, 438; Calabrese, 2016 at 535, 538, 540-541, 544) . Furthermore, Dobzhansky is not a valid surrogate for the 1956 committee, for one reason, because he did not serve on ita distinction that Calabrese's language does not always clarify (Calabrese, 2015 at 440) . Dobzhansky served on the second NAS genetics committee, whose report came out in 1960. Moreover, the correspondence at issue was written after the first NAS report came out in 1956. It was Dobzhansky who was charged at the time to have "bent [his] interpretation of experimental results to get money out of the AEC." (Lewontin et al., 2001; Seltzer, 2007) . Readers should be skeptical of all such mutterings about the ethics of scientific competitors, whether expressed in the past or today, but it is possible that Dobzhansky's comment about stretching a point may say more about him than anyone else. His correspondent, Demerec, one of the actual1956 committee members, was uncomfortable with high risk, genetic-death calculations, putting him in the group discussed in the 1956 report that did not think such calculations were meaningful. Dobzhansky's words reveal a belief that anyone using the genetic death model, as opposed to his more balanced method, must be exaggerating the risk in order to drum up support for genetics. However, the six geneticists who made the high calculations for the 1956 report apparently did not see it that way; they thought the calculations were sobering, albeit uncertain. I found nothing in the committee transcripts to challenge that view expressed in the report. On the contrary, many committee members indicated their concern in meetings about radiation-induced genetic damage, while recognizing that some risks must be borne (NAS, 1956b at 21, 22, 61, 65, 96, 120, 155, 168, 195, 204, 267) . It is worth noting that Demerec supported the no-threshold linear theory and Dobzhansky did, too, as indicated by his putting his name to the second (1960) genetics committee report. It was their view of the low genetic consequences per unit of dose that set them apart from more aggressive committee members. Calabrese's evidence that the 1956 committee members were engaged in deception and fraud amounts only to innuendo.
Developments after 1956
Calabrese cites a number of post 1956 reports for reasons that are not entirely clear, because the 1956 NAS committee cannot be faulted for not knowing about subsequent work. In any case, his interpretation of post-1956 studies is not complete. When discussing a 1977 paper by Russell that found possible threshold behavior mutations in female mice (irradiated oocytes) (Russell, 1977) , Calabrese avoids mentioning the fact that the mutation rate is much smaller for females than for males (irradiated spermatogonia and spermatozoa), so that the dose response for a mixed population of males and females would largely follow the male curve, which Russell and colleagues found to be linear in other studies (with different slopes at two different dose rates) (Russell and Kelly, 1982; Russell et al., 1958) . (Professor Calabrese has returned to post-1956 papers by Russell in a new set of articles about a 1972 NAS committee known as BEIR-I (Calabrese, in press, in press ). To avoid confusion, note that an acronym often used for the 1956 NAS committee is BEAR-I, not BEIR-I).
Calabrese in his discussion of post-1956 literature does not mention findings like those of a 1976 reviewer of linearity in fruit flies who gave a range of 5 R to 4000 R (Sankaranarayanan and Sobels, 1976 at 1139) . Finally, in Fig. S-9 , I have extended Fig. 1 by adding three lower dose points from 8-to 25-r determined in 1963 by Shiomi et al. using the same protocol for fruit flies as used by the Stern group (Shiomi et al., 1963) . Fig. S-9 shows a strengthened linear response and an inferior fit for a pure quadratic function.
Muller's change of dose rate figures
In what is certainty a minor issue involving footnotes, and not a criticism of the 1956 report, Calabrese claims that Muller's use in a 1950 article of the numerical factor " < 0.001" instead of "0.00165" led to an exaggeration of the range of doses over which dose-rate independence had been measured; moreover this was supposedly "a deliberate deception " (Calabrese, 2016 at 541) . I include a discussion of this accusation here in the main text, because it seems to provide another example of leaping to damning conclusions that turn out to have no basis.
First of all, the discrepancy of a factor of approximately 2 is not important to resolve and the discrepancy is not significant. The factor of 2 determines the range over which dose rate independence has been shown to hold. It is either a factor of 400,000 or 200,000, an enormous range; either number makes the point. An explanation of the discrepancy that is more logical than deception involves Muller making an error in dividing by a dose of 25-and not 50-r, thereby obtaining 0.000825 r/minute instead of 0.00165 r/min for 50 r. Errors do get made even by geniuses like Muller. The first (incorrect) number appears in a late added footnote in a paper published in January of 1950, with only unpublished data cited for its basis. However, in another paper published six months later in June 1950, Muller used the correct rate of 0.00165, once again in a footnote. This time, he was able to cite the Uphoff and Stern publication in Science, which is another temporal marker, indicating that the footnote published later in time was, indeed, written later in time. Calabrese apparently has the publication dates reversed, thinking the paper with the 0.00165 was published not in June but before the January one (Calabrese, 2016 at 541) . He then proceeds to infer that Muller must have been deceptive. If unfounded leaps like this one are made, as well as the claim that Stern charged Uphoff with bias, how can one be accepting of any other insinuations about character made by Calabrese, now or in the future? At some point, credibility in these matters is lost.
Discussion
There appear to be lessons here for the scientific community when faced with controversies that may spill over into the policy arena, particularly in cases where outlier studies are elevated above all others and where claims of self-interest are attributed to explain the acceptance of the dominant theory. Challenges are likely to be made to the default hypothesis itself and its right to define the point around which the 95% confidence barrier should be set. Thus, some disputes are simply a debate about which theory should be the default. Challenging orthodoxy is the norm in science, but when the outcome affects public policy and regulations, the stakes are higher. In such cases, a) Challenges may involve heroic weightings against the standard studies that underlie acceptance of the default; they may include positive weighting only of studies that contradict, or are thought to contradict, the default hypothesis. b) Circular reasoning, e.g., presuming that weaknesses in study design explain unexpected outcomes, may creep into justifications of the default at some point, which as long as it remains, will provide valid evidence for challengers. c) Challenges to specific studies may be valid (and should be so acknowledged) but others may be devoid of statistical analysis. When challengers step outside their scientific fields into historical or other social science analysis in order to buttress their arguments, assessment by an interdisciplinary team may be appropriate. d) Challenges may ignore evidence that falls on the other side of the default theory (e.g., supra-linearity), which, if allowed to stand, leads to an unbalanced debate, with the middle ground shifted away from the default.
There will always be some studies that show results different from the dominant theory. Without statistical analysis, such as metaanalysis, and without an eye on theory, their existence is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the dominant theory is wrong. A proper use of outlier studies is to assist in establishing an uncertainty range around the average, something which is not done often enough, unfortunately.
Challenges may be intimidating and difficult, particularly when they cross the line to attack the integrity of other scientists and institutional review bodies. And, confronting challengers in public may give greater publicity to attacks on scientists and institutions than would occur with silence. It does not follow, however, that complete and endless silence is desirable, for without early refutation the charges may more easily escalate and take root in the political arena, as they have in the climate case, restricting opportunities to narrow disputes through scientific discussion and debate. Highest priority in responding should be given to situations where the normal institutions that referee disputes impinging on policy, such as the US NAS, have their objectivity challenged.
Without a counter narrative as to how the default came to be accepted by the bulk of the community, defenses may flounder before the rhetorical power of a good story, especially one populated with supposed villains. What I have tried to do here and in my earlier critique is to provide material for a counter narrative.
Merely providing layers and layers of evidence in favor of a theory to the non-technical and possibly skeptical reader may not get to the question of how much evidence is enough. Asking the public to act as amateur scientists is not effective or realistic, particularly because much of the public sees science as true or false and may become skeptical in the face of conflicting evidence. A human story may be a valuable addition.
A bad strategy, I think, is to overstate the case for a theory in all domains. Uncertainty is a fact of scientific life, but uncertainty can usually be bounded and it does not swing only in the direction favored by a challenger. Case in point: The LNT has uncertainty above and below linearity, but despite this, the good news is that at very low doses all models predict the risk is low.
Conclusion
In my first contribution to this series (Beyea, 2016d) , I disputed the idea that the committee had been stacked and I found that the committee got most things right. I showed that the three estimates of genetic damage that were accepted by the committee as a whole have ended up matching current views, namely the dose threshold (zero), the "doubling dose," and the estimate of (visible) damage in the first generation. The 4th prediction of the committee, essentially the slope of the linear response out to multiple generations, was not unanimous, with the more cautious members' views turning out to match current thinking. Calabrese's language in places suggests that the vigorous argument over the slope of the linear term actually extended to arguments over linearity and the (non) existence of a genetic threshold, but that was not the case. He states:
"If their profound disagreements were to become known, the efforts of the Panel to change risk assessment policies might have been threatened." at 539).
However, there was no internal disagreement over both the committee's finding that harmful genetic impacts continued (linearly) down to zero dose and their recommendation that medical doses should be reduced "to the lowest limit consistent with medical necessity." The change that was implicitly recommended was to have dose exposure standards take into account genetic effects, also an idea about which there was no disagreement among committee members.
In my earlier response in this journal, I also pointed out that the committee's consensus views agreed with both those expressed in a detailed study in the UK (MRC, 1956) and those expressed in a WHO workshop (WHO, 1957) , including a majority of geneticists from the European continent.
In my current contribution, I found that the radiation-biology science of the 1950s, in fruit flies, grasshoppers and most plants, with theoretical support from hit theory, overwhelmingly supported the genetic LNT as the default hypothesis for interpreting genetic dose response at low doses, where single hits would dominate. Attempts by Calabrese to show otherwise generally fail in the face of statistical and textual analysis. There was no misrepresentation of the research record by the 1956 NAS committee.
I found that the committee did an excellent job in presenting to the public the state of the science. (I discuss in the Supplementary Material Calabrese's suspicion that the 1956 NAS committee did not have the basis for writing a more detailed report, had they decided to do so, or, I might add, had they been asked at some point to do so by a government agency involved in standard setting.) The committee's report distinguished the unanimous views about linearity and no threshold, while balancing the contested views about the strength of the association between radiation and genetic damage in humans. Not only was the science on the committee's side, it would have been irresponsible in my view for the committee to suppress what it believed to be the truth. This was a time when the country and the world were worried about uncertain amounts of future radiation exposure from nuclear fallout. It would be many decades before studies of the A-bomb survivors firmly indicated that genetic risks to humans per unit exposure were much less than expected in the 1950s. The fact that the strength of the association was later found after decades of study to be (happily) weak and consistent with the views of the moderate wing of the NAS committee, means that those who argued otherwise were just wrong, not biased, about the relevant radiobiology. The social impact of that error in slope may be worthy of its own review.
From my analysis, little evidence that Calabrese uses to support his cover-up hypothesis is left standing. Both the Stern group and the 1956 NAS committee got the science right about threshold and linear form within experimental error and consistent with modern views, so there was nothing to cover up about a threshold in the first place. And, there was no internal charge made in the Stern group reports about personal bias. The committee's report did not suppress views of some of its members; neither did it hide disagreements among committee members nor uncertainty in quantitative estimates of genetic damage. There was no fraud and deception on the committee's part or on Stern's The committee indicated its willingness to go beyond its semipopular exposition and provide more detail, if asked by agencies involved in standard setting -detail that existed in abundance in the scientific literature, including recent review articles that had been written by committee members (Kaufmann, 1954; Muller, 1954a Muller, , 1954b Neel et al., 1953; Russell, 1954; Sturtevant, 1954; Wright, 1950) . Still, despite what I have pointed out, I certainly do not expect to see a shift in Calabrese's historical views, given his very strong prior beliefs about the science and the innuendo he draws from selected correspondence and reports. I presume he will find ways to bypass the breaks I have made in his chain of inferences, so debate will continue, although presumably with correction of errors and/or misinterpretations. There are ways to criticize scientists of the day for their judgments and decisions that do not require accusations of ethics violations based on circumstantial inferences.
It is my hope that my analysis in this and my previous critique (Beyea, 2016d) will be useful to objective readers in giving them a fuller picture of the relevant, historical science and helping them to evaluate Calabrese's startling claims. I also hope that the lessons I identify from this dispute over mainstream radiobiological science will be helpful in future contentious disputes, regardless of the discipline and the particular issue.
No study and no supporting institution can be perfect. The 1956 committee report may well have underestimated the uncertainty in the estimate of six geneticists, reporting a factor of 10 rather than 15, but the difference is minor and the entire committee signed off on this, including those who did not support the estimate in the first place. There is always room for improvement, as we can see in Calabrese's writing, and, no doubt, in mine. Partisans can always find openings to be one-sided. I hope that readers, before taking at face value Calabrese's assertions about ethical failures and the state of the scientific record, will now keep in mind the possibility that his writings are not a source of balanced interpretation of evidence. In general, a high bar for judgment should exist whenever a stakeholder for one theory claims to have discredited the theory of a competitor. Calabrese's misreading of the 1947 report by Uphoff and Stern concerning investigator bias (Uphoff and Stern, 1947 at 3), which is accessible via the link in the citation for all to see, should not be forgotten, especially when contemplating his past or future claims about ethical violations supposedly admitted in, or identified by him through, private correspondence or other obscure sources. Professor Calabrese, it seems, would do better as a critic of the LNT than he would as a prosecutor of its advocates.
It is easy to make mistakes in dealing with far-reaching material involving multiple authors and reports prepared by non-living researchers. I am sure that I have also missed or confused some text. The risk of making such errors in historical analysis is one reason why an analyst should be particularly careful in making ethics charges about individuals (or institutions) -charges that are difficult to correct and erase, once aired.
Funding sources
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
